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Meditation Matters: Replies to the Anti-McMindfulness Bandwagon! 
 
Abstract 
Certain scholars and intellectuals—for example, Slavoj Žižek, Owen Flanagan, Evan 
Thompson, Gilbert Ryle, Robert Nozick, Allen Ginsberg, Ron Purser, David Loy, Robert 
Sharf, David Forbes, Suzanne Moore, and others—have joined the bandwagon to criticize 
meditation, or more specifically, mindfulness, the increasingly popular, originally 
Buddhist form of meditation, the cultural explosion of interest in which Purser and Loy 
have cleverly described with their neologism “McMindfulness.” I address four types of 
objections these thinkers have made, some independently: meditation (a) is incoherent or 
ineffective, (b) fails to attempt to try to change the world, (c) is not really as important to 
Buddhism as Westerners seem to think it is, as evidenced by the few actually serious 
practitioners to be found in Buddhism, and (d) ought not to be separated from its 
Buddhist ethical framework. In rebutting all four claims, I address some on their own 
terms, but part of my strategy is to put them in dialogue with each other so that they may 
refute each other. 
I argue in defense of meditation. Many and diverse kinds of objections have been leveled against 
meditation, but I focus only on some representative ones thought to be compelling. Some of the 
objections are rather informal, while others are philosophically technical; my responses will vary 
in kind, but even my responses to the technical philosophical objections ought to be 
comprehensible to non-philosophers. Some objections to meditation predate its being all the 
rage, as some have described its recent popularity, but most of them are based on its recent 
popularity. I defend meditation against both sorts of objections.  
 
Moore1 
For example, an article appeared in the Guardian very clearly exhibiting one of the very 
positions I am targeting here. “Mindfulness Is All about Self-Help. It Does Nothing to Change an 
Unjust World,” by Suzanne Moore,2 is essentially a polemic about the many non-unjust-world-
changing shortcomings of mindfulness. As the title reveals, however, this polemic is analogous 
to the following complaint: “Journalism Is All about Selling News. It Does Nothing to Change 
an Unjust World.”  
 Somebody, surely, has to report the news, as objectively as possible, which is a distinct 
task from that of trying to alter what will become the news. Is it really a shortcoming of 
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journalism that it merely reports on the injustices in the world but makes no concerted efforts to 
change it? xxIt is no more a shortcoming of journalism that it fails to try to change an unjust 
world into a just one than it is a shortcoming of sports that they do not try to change an unjust 
world into a just one, any more than it is a shortcoming of psychotherapy that it fails to try to 
change an unjust world into a just one, to mention just two more analogies. The list of analogous 
things about which it is not a shortcoming about those things that they do not try to change an 
unjust world into a just world includes, but certainly is not exhausted by, the following: interest 
in or the collection of stamps, interest in or the collection of recipes, interest in or the collection 
of aquarium fish or related pets, interest in or devoting one’s life to understanding and teaching 
mathematics or linguistics or philosophy of language or aesthetics or medieval literature or 
Egyptology or semiotics or the Feldenkrais method or cryptology or hermeneutics or 
aerodynamics or Wittgenstein or gardening, karate, chess, poetry, art, hydraulics, Classical 
music, Zumba, dentistry, roofing, rolfing, carpentry, wine-making, embroidery, Pilates, hotel 
management, automotive mechanics, vinyl repair, bicycling, marathons, accounting, skydiving, 
fishing, deep sea diving, theater, prestidigitation, photography, calligraphy, food trucks, method 
acting, writing criticisms or defenses about mindfulness—the list goes on indefinitely, but 
hopefully the absurdity of claims of the form it is a shortcoming of x that x does nothing to 
attempt to change an unjust world into a just world is by now abundantly clear.  
 Yes, just as anything in the world can become the object of philosophical inquiry and 
examination under the right circumstances, even a ham sandwich (why is it, really, that pork is 
kosher?), so too any item on the list of things above (about which it is no shortcoming that they 
are not world-changers) could, in principle, play a role in changing the world in some significant 
way, under certain hypothetical scenarios and, even if not, should be treated as if engagement in 
it and devotion of one’s life to it or a significant amount of one’s time and efforts to it matter 
ethically and thus are subject to inquiry about whether such efforts might be better placed in the 
Facebook protesting of fracking, of tax laws that benefit the 1%, or of the situation in Gaza—as 
if Facebook activism even purports to amount to a world-changing activity. (Indeed, the illusion 
that Facebook activism, so to speak, counts as activism, might prevent real activism.)  
 But surely those are all individual choices—for example, whether one ought to repost a 
political meme (and then have to deal with the obligation to debate with ideological 
fundamentalists) or watch another episode of Breaking Bad (and release some of the stress of life 
by entertaining a fantasy)—best made by individuals situated in the embedded spaces in which 
their skills, wherewithal, economic lives, functional matrices and overall horizons of reasons for 
action are enmeshed. Each of us must decide for ourselves how much of our lives (and when and 
how) it is appropriate for us to dedicate to the furtherance of the common good, to the best of our 
abilities, given our limitations, and how much of our lives are appropriately devoted to our 
obligations to our own minds and bodies, loved ones, and other circles of commitment expanding 
outward from the center of our being toward all other sentient beings and the rest of the cosmos.  
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 Most of my arguments both above and in what follows are arguments by analogy of the 
form: that doesn’t make sense, because that’s like this other thing that obviously doesn’t make 
sense. The problem with analogies is that for something to count as one there must be both some 
elements in common between the two things being compared or else there would be no basis for 
the comparison, and some elements not in common or else the two things to be compared would 
actually be one and the same thing. This requirement of a difference between items constituting 
an analogy opens the door to charges that the items being compared are not properly analogous 
because some of their features are not shared, not shared sufficiently, or not shared in the right 
way. To assess whether such a charge of faulty analogy is apt, it is not enough that there be some 
difference between the items being compared, for, again, that is a requirement of any analogy. 
Thus, for an analogy to be faulty, an item in the pair of compared items must lack the feature that 
is the point of the analogy. I have made many analogies here between the complaint that it is a 
shortcoming of mindfulness that it fails to attempt to change an unjust world into a just world 
and similar objections of the general form it is a shortcoming of x that x fails to attempt to 
change an unjust world into a just world, where my list of instances or values of x is quite long 
(weight lifting, stamp collecting, Pilates, chess, and so on). Do any of these items constitute 
faulty analogies?  
 Before we answer that, note that it is enough if one of them is not faulty. I could examine 
each analogy to assess whether it is faulty, but logic and considerations of space suggest that I 
only assess one analogy. Take weightlifting, then, which Ron Purser has suggested might be a 
faulty analogy.3 Here is why I think it is not faulty. Many people practice weight lifting for any 
or all of the following expected benefits: working out relaxes them, it relieves stress, it supports a 
form of social bonding, it improves immune functioning, flexibility, bone density, strength, 
resilience, weight regulation, metabolism, etc. Meditation is practiced by many because it is 
touted as yielding many of these benefits. Thus, meditation and weightlifting share many 
motivational factors, making them somewhat analogous, on the one hand. On the other hand, one 
might object that it is not the case that weightlifting is all the rage, so to speak, like mindfulness 
is, and thus that there is a disanalogy. But the unshared elements here—one item being all the 
rage and the other not being all the rage—are irrelevant to the point of the analogy, and that is 
that it is a shortcoming of x that x fails to attempt to change an unjust world into a just world.  
 Technically, even the shared elements mentioned here, which may be summarized as 
expected (personal and interpersonal) improvements associated with motivations for engaging in 
both cases of x (meditation and weightlifting), are technically irrelevant to the validity of the 
analogy. For that, all that is needed is that both items are instances of the formula it is a 
shortcoming of x that x fails to attempt to change an unjust world into a just world. However, the 
more elements in common in the pair of items that constitute an analogy, the more likely it is to 
achieve its goal, which is not so much to prove a point as to facilitate understanding by showing 
how some feature that is not fully transparent in the original case may be seen more readily in the 
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analogous case, which then ought to make that feature more visible in the original case. 
Analogies are not technical proofs, but guides to understanding. Thus, even an analogy that 
proves technically faulty on careful analysis might nonetheless guide understanding.  
 And we can always patch up an analogy that seems faulty on some such technical 
grounds, by imagining hypothetical conditions to make the two compared cases more analogous. 
For example, weightlifting does not come to us from a millennia old spiritual tradition the way 
mindfulness has come to us from Buddhism, so that is a seemingly significant disanalogous 
element that someone might appeal to in order to deny the point of—and thus dismiss—the 
analogy. But we could imagine a hypothetically different past, a possible history in which 
Shaolin Buddhist monks first invented and institutionalized the practice of weightlifting as a 
form of yogic bodily control (connected with martial arts), which then spread to all of Buddhism, 
and for various other hypothetically imaginative reasons never took hold in Western society 
until, like McMindfulness, it was culturally appropriated from Buddhism, studied by 
neuroscience, applied in the military, Google, grammar schools, and so forth. Then the analogy 
would be more perfect: traditionalist Buddhist weightlifters could complain about the dangers of 
becoming muscular and strong outside the Buddhist ethical framework, non-Buddhists could 
complain that weightlifting (within or outside Buddhism) fails to try to change the world, 
philosophers could complain that it doesn’t really work or amount to anything significant, and 
Buddhists and other lovers of weightlifting could complain that empirical studies about 
weightlifting threaten to miss its true meaning, as if strength was really measurably located in the 
muscles, and so on.4 
 In all the analogous cases at hand (karate, stamp collecting, and so on), none of this really 
matters anyway, for they seem valid insofar as one may understand that a claim about each of 
them to the effect that it is a shortcoming of that item that it fails to attempt to change an unjust 
world into a just world would be either simply false or, if true, only trivially true. Thus, even if it 
is irrelevant whether a certain mundane or otherwise necessary activity like brushing one’s teeth 
doesn’t change the world, it might be arguable that it a shortcoming of any behavior that it fails 
to attempt to change the world, but then it would be a shortcoming of almost everything we do, 
other than efforts specifically designed to try to change the world, that they do not involve efforts 
to change the world. But the sense in which, if this is true at all, would be trivial, for then not 
only brushing one’s teeth, but sleeping, falling in love, earning a living, spending time with one’s 
elderly grandparents, tying one’s shoes, and so forth, would all be subject to such alleged 
shortcomings. But clearly they are not subject to such objections. Reductio ad absurdum! 
 Ironically, from the perspective of Buddhism, it actually is a shortcoming of almost 
everything most of us ever do that it is done mindlessly and not as part of an intentional, mindful 
effort to either become enlightened (directly or indirectly for the benefit of all sentient beings) or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Thompson has criticized contemplative neuroscience research for its reductionism in investigating meditation 
through brain studies, which he sees as analogous to thinking a bird’s flight is somehow located in its wings 
(Heuman 2014). 
	  5	  
	  
to directly reduce suffering in all sentient beings. And attaining enlightenment or reducing the 
suffering of sentient beings is not only one way of changing the world for the better, but from the 
Buddhist perspective, the most important way. Be that as it may, however, it is not treated as a 
criticism to be leveled against all unenlightened or non-enlightenment-seeking beings, but rather 
a fact to guide the enlightenment-seeking being. From the perspective of Buddhism, the best 
thing anyone can do is make oneself a better being, as nobody can make anyone else a better 
being—it is hard enough to make oneself a better being. Nothing about this perspective 
precludes or disinclines Buddhists from compassionate efforts to reduce suffering and to try to 
make the world a better place. To the contrary, that is the whole point. True, mindfulness 
extracted from this larger ethical framework is not as intentionally directed toward these ends as 
it would be within the Buddhist perspective, but serious, most long-term practitioners believe, 
reasonably, I think, that any emphasis on mindfulness in one’s life—no matter what kind of life 
that is—will naturally foster the blossoming of these imperatives, as evidenced by the parable of 
the Buddhist thief. 
 A certain thief, inspired by the Buddhist teaching, asked the Master to accept him as a 
disciple, but begged to be allowed to continue his life as a thief, insisting he was incorrigible as 
such. The Master allowed this, advising the thief only to maintain mindful awareness of all his 
actions while stealing. Three weeks later the man returned, complaining that he could not both 
steal and maintain full awareness of what he was doing, for while fully aware of all the 
implications of his actions his compassion for his victims and what his deeds would cause for 
them prevented him from stealing.5  
 Arguably, this parable illustrates that—contrary to the objection that mindfulness fails to 
attempt to change an unjust world into a just world—the ubiquitous acceptance of the 
mindlessness that is ceaselessly forced upon us by all the competing digital demands, sources of 
information, and related media and other competitive forces in society is precisely what enables 
the maintenance of the evil status quo. If that is correct, and it seems to me that it makes a lot 
more sense than the objections against mindfulness do, then we are under a political obligation to 
put an end to digital multi-tasking, and to take up practices like mindfulness as weapons in our 
attempt to reclaim ourselves. The mantra of this mindful political imperative might read: Occupy 
your own consciousness! 
 It may just be an article of Buddhist faith that meditative skill promotes sensitivity, 
empathy, compassion, and the like. The conceptual connection between heightened awareness 
and compassion is not obvious to non-Buddhists, but for Buddhists it is clear that enlightenment 
entails the dissolution or at least the desolidifying of the self/other distinction, which intuitively 
eliminates any unwholesome self-centered motivations and thus inherently promotes a 
disposition toward altruism, but a form of altruism that is not self-effacing, as the enlightened 
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being is also a being that matters. But it arguably begs the question in favor of Buddhism to say 
that enlightenment entails the dissolution of the self/non-self distinction and thus altruism, for 
non-Buddhists cannot be expected to take it on faith that the Buddhist’s eightfold meditative path 
actually leads to enlightenment.  
 However, even if enlightenment is better understood as a limit case than as an actuality, 
then it does not seem to beg the question to think it is reasonable that long, serious, disciplined, 
mindfulness practice generates experiential insights into the nature of the self and all mental 
states as characterized by momentariness or impermanence, impersonality or the interplay of 
impersonal conditions and factors, and ontological insubstantiality or existential emptiness, 
which key insights or “marks of existence” together discourage belief in the value of acting on 
ego-volitional impulses, craving, and clinging, and thus which foster the falling away of 
selfishness, and thus which at least indirectly promote spontaneous altruism. One need not 
believe in the literal attainment of nirvana (enlightenment) in order to believe in these things. In 
this regard, Flanagan seems right in holding that it is enough, philosophically, for purposes of 
validating the overall Buddhist world view and teaching, that some meditation virtuosos actually 
instantiate these practices and qualities. Yes, that may suffice, but surely it is no argument 
against mindfulness being or becoming all the rage. 
 Let’s return to the masses of hopefully mindful consumers, soldiers, Google employees, 
and so forth that the phrase “all the rage” denotes. If all a stressed out, underpaid, overworked, 
over-informed, existentially confused urbanite significantly addicted to social media, constant 
checking of her cell phone, and marathon television series like Breaking Bad, 24, and Orange Is 
the New Black can do to try to take care of herself relatively inexpensively is to cultivate a 
mindfulness practice, who are we to begrudge her because she hasn’t joined the Peace Corps or 
because she cannot afford the professional friendship of her own Gestalt psychotherapist? And 
just because someone is in the military, works at Google, can afford to wear Prada, or can live 
off their invested stocks, does that disqualify them from entitlement to enlightenment-fostering 
practices? Are the otherwise privileged members of 1% not also entitled to enjoy the fruits of 
weightlifting or brushing their teeth? Do we really think the movement toward the improvement 
of society, away from being unjust and toward being more just, is better served by a majority of 
citizens who are less mindful? This strikes me as a no-brainer, which is why either (a) I must be 
missing something in all this hoo-hah on the bandwagon against McMindfulness, although I have 
some ideas about what is behind it, which I will discuss below when I recount my own 
experiences with the analogous popularization and watering down of yoga, or (b) it simply must 
be confused. I think it is (b), but I invite others to tutor me about (a), about what I have missed. 
 Similarly unfair objections could be leveled against what may be caricatured as 
sustainable-shopping-bag-toting social media activists, whose chanting of their polemicist 
mantras and performances of the politically correct equivalences of yogic postures in all of their 
public actions amount to no more than supporting the appearance (to themselves, if nobody else) 
of insulating them from the guilt of their limousine liberal lifestyles but which, even when 
	  7	  
	  
collectively agglomerated, don’t put a small dent in global injustice, but function only to deflect 
attention away from them and onto the targets of their diatribes. Talk about the pot calling the 
kettle mindless.  
 Let us move on to some of the other critiques of meditation. After belaboring the silly 
objection that it is a shortcoming of meditation that it fails to attempt to change an unjust world 
into a just world (and I’m afraid we will see further, slightly different iterations of this objection 
below), addressing a genuinely philosophical objection to meditation ought at least to be 
intellectually uplifting. I group some of my subsequent rebuttals together, but I review and rebut 
some of these criticisms one at a time, beginning with the earliest, that of Gilbert Ryle. Although 
Ryle specifically targeted introspection, and introspection is not necessarily identical with 
mindfulness or certain other forms of meditation, introspection nonetheless counts as a form of 
meditative awareness, very close to mindfulness, a standard Buddhist meditation technique. 
 
Ryle 
In his 1949 classic, The Concept of Mind, analytic philosopher Gilbert Ryle argued famously that 
the concept of introspection is self-refuting. Ryle formulated what many took to be an intuitive if 
not compelling counter-example to introspection, to be described shortly, but the counter-
example was part of his larger, somewhat behaviorist campaign against the Cartesian notion of 
mind as something that has privileged, immediately transparent access to itself, and the more 
general idea that the first-personal perspective or subjective stance—which has to do with 
phenomenology, with what the subject directly experiences, feels, perceives, thinks, and so on—
is philosophically valid, among other things he called into question. Of course, if the entire first-
personal perspective is challenged and meditative practices all operate under the assumption of 
the validity of the first-personal perspective, then meditative practices are thereby called into 
question by simple implication. Although a rebuttal to his counter-example would count towards 
a rebuttal of his rejection of the validity of the first-personal perspective, we need only focus on 
his counter-example and the idea that it allegedly undermines the coherence of meditation. For 
introspection—inspecting inward and/or watching one’s own mental states—is precisely what 
goes on in various Buddhist and other forms of meditation.6 Nevertheless, it should be reiterated 
that Ryle’s counter-example to introspection was intended to illustrate the incoherence of the 
Cartesian model of mind as immediately accessible and transparent to itself. The point is that he 
took aim at introspection, most likely only because he thought it illustrated the model of self-
transparent mind he rejected. He may not have objected to certain kinds of meditation, if they did 
not presuppose what he took to be a faulty model of mind. 
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 Ryle, then, interpreted the concept of introspection strictly—arguably, too strictly—to 
involve the idea of purely observing the contents of one’s own mental states without the 
observation itself having any influence on the mental state being observed; that is, pure 
introspection must be non-intervening, non-interfering, objective observation. Ryle thought it 
was intuitive that if the act of observing any mental state influenced that mental state in any way, 
then it was not truly separate from it, and thus it could not count as genuine introspection. This 
intuition might be justified as an instance of a more general scientific principle against 
researchers participating in or otherwise influencing the outcome of their own experiments, in 
which case if there could not be any such thing as purely non-intervening introspection, then any 
putative practitioner of introspection would be guilty of something like experimenter bias or non-
objectivity, and thus their claims about their mental states would be tainted and suspect.7  
 Ryle’s intuitive counter-example to the idea of introspection, then, involved the idea that 
if one could actually approximate bringing it about that one was able to take what would 
putatively amount to an objective observational or impartial witnessing stance towards one’s 
own mental state of, say, rage, then the very act of doing so would—a fortiori, if not a priori—
undeniably diminish the intensity, magnitude, and duration of the rage being observed. It would, 
in other words, interfere with it, in which case if it succeeded in establishing an objective stance 
in one sense, it would refute itself thereby, in another sense. This counter-example certainly 
makes sense, at least prima facie. For being able to muster up even the modicum of mental 
stability or equilibrium that would be necessary for it to be true at all that one was in any sense 
introspecting one’s state of rage, as opposed to being completely (mindlessly) in its grip, it 
would presumably have to be true that one had to thereby divert a significant amount of mental 
energy from the rage itself and to simultaneously create some sort of non-rage-like conditions in 
order to maintain even a fragment of introspective awareness of the rage. I grant this to Ryle.  
 However, on reflection, even if Ryle’s introspecting-rage counter-example does manage 
to deal a blow to the Cartesian model of self-transparent mind that Ryle targeted with it (which is 
not necessarily obvious, nor necessarily a concern of ours here), the counter-example fails 
nonetheless to undermine the version of the idea of introspection that matters for purposes of 
assessing the efficacy of meditation. First, while it may be interesting or useful if it was possible 
to have a purely non-intervening form of introspection, it is not obvious that such a non-
intervening form of introspection is so centrally definitive of the very concept of introspection 
that no other concepts are worthy of the name; nor is it obvious that non-intervening 
introspection is impossible in all cases and in all senses. More importantly, it is not obvious that 
the only desirable form of introspection is a purely non-intervening one. Indeed, the opposite—
an intervening form of introspection—may be preferable, and probably is. 
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 Of course any attempt to notice or attend to one’s mental state necessarily thereby 
enlarges, so to speak, the resulting mental state to include a self-referential or self-monitoring 
aspect that was not previously there in the non-introspected mental state, in which case it seems 
a priori impossible to introspect without intervening—at least in this way—in the mental state 
that is being introspected. It does not follow, however, that this kind of intervening must always 
undermine the idea that some form of introspection is occurring, or that it can be objective in 
some relevant sense. We can describe this kind of intervening as at least involving a kind of 
change that can be identified merely formally or syntactically, as similar to the way that, say, 
adding a propositional attitude (e.g., believing, knowing, doubting, remembering, and so forth, 
are propositional attitudes, that is, attitudes towards propositions) to a proposition (e.g., the 
claims that the cat is on the mat, or that the earth is round, are propositions) results in at least a 
formal, grammatical, or syntactical change. Let’s call this a syntactic intervention. It is a separate 
question whether the addition of a particular propositional attitude to a particular proposition 
alters its content in ways that are more or less substantive than that of what can identified by or 
as a merely formal syntactical intervention.  
 For instance, if I assert the proposition, that the cat is on the mat, then that differs 
grammatically or syntactically from my assertion of my propositional attitude toward that 
proposition, to the effect that I think it is true that the cat is on the mat. But asserting the truth of 
a proposition, or my belief in its truth, is roughly equivalent to a redundancy of asserting the 
proposition: in other words, if I say I think it is true that the cat is on the mat this means about 
the same thing as my asserting that the cat is on the mat, in which case the syntactical 
intervention in this case apparently imparts no substantive change to the content of the assertion 
of the base proposition. Thus, such an innocuous, merely syntactic intervention as this would not 
jeopardize the validity or objectivity of the base proposition simply by virtue of the fact that it 
had interfered with it or altered it in some way. 
 Just as the addition of propositional attitudes to propositions generates a syntactical 
intervention that merely may be but need not necessarily be substantive or negligible, so too the 
addition of introspective elements to mental states, for example, those of perceiving, thinking 
thoughts, and experiencing pain, generates a formal or syntactic intervention that may be but 
need not necessarily be substantive or negligible. These basic or first-order mental states differ, 
respectively, from the introspective or higher-order mental states of being aware that one is 
perceiving, noticing that one is thinking thoughts, or attending to the fact that one is 
experiencing pain. While these introspective elements may count as propositional attitudes, and 
thus simply syntactical interventions per se, it might be useful to note that there is a difference 
between introspective propositional attitudes, such as being aware that, attending to the fact that, 
being mindful that, and so forth, and non-introspective propositional attitudes, like believing, 
doubting, suspecting, knowing, and so on. That difference is between metacognitive or otherwise 
meta-level attitudes and first-order ones, respectively. This distinction will play a role shortly, 
but the shift from first-order to meta-level mental states, like the shift from propositions to 
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propositional attitudes, need not be substantively more than the merely formal, innocuous 
syntactic difference, but may be more noxious, so to speak, depending on the particulars of 
individual cases. 
 Thus, if I am looking at the sunset, my sudden awareness that I am looking at the sunset 
might count as a spontaneous moment of introspection, and thus it might count as a syntactic or 
meta-level intervention, but whatever alteration it brings about in my mental state may or may 
not be relatively negligible, dependent on other factors. Of course, it could lead me to alter my 
behavior in ways in which the first-order mental state of simply seeing the sunset does not—say, 
to take a picture of it, to relish in the joy of existence as reflected in it, to compose a haiku 
(poem) about it, or to call my partner to come look out the window—if the introspective aspect 
of it was heightened in certain ways. But, alternately, it could just add an otherwise innocuous 
element of awareness to my perception. (Arguably, even when that meta-awareness alone does 
not actually manifest in a change, it nonetheless grounds a disposition that enables a range of 
abilities that then may be acted on, such as the ability to better remember, articulate, and/or act 
on that perceptual information.) Does it follow that this kind of innocuous syntactic or meta-level 
intervention necessarily warps that part of the resulting enlarged (because now meta-level-
including) mental state that was present prior to the enlarging addition of the introspective 
element? I do not see why that must always be so. Surely, the case of introspecting rage is one 
that does seem to necessarily alter rage in a substantive way, but rage is not representative of all 
first-order mental states, as it fails to represent those that are capable of being introspected with 
negligible degrees of substantive interference, as in the first-order perception of the sunset. 
 Virtuoso practitioners of mindfulness meditation, one of the central meditative techniques 
common to most forms of Buddhism, moreover, cultivate an introspective level of skill that 
might very well reach a threshold of success such that it is sometimes if not increasingly true that 
they exhibit the ability to impartially observe the arising and passing of momentary mental 
states—even powerful ones like lust, envy, and hatred—without intervening in them or altering 
their first-order content whatsoever. We will say more about this later, but to simply assert it in 
the context of Ryle’s claim without some justification would appear to beg the question, so I will 
say a few words about it for now. First, recall that a merely syntactic or meta-level intervention 
alone does not necessitate a substantive (as opposed to a purely formal) interference, as has just 
been argued, rather forcefully. Second, the Buddhist tradition of meditative disciplines is 
millennia old, and has been perfected by all those generations of meditation masters. Third, the 
primary prescription of Buddhism is to live a meditative, mindful, or introspective life, so it is 
not at all surprising that virtuoso meditation practitioners should perfect the art of introspection 
to the degree that rebuts Ryle’s claim even when it comes to many powerful mental states, if not 
rage itself. (Rage is not only a misrepresentative example when it comes to the issue of non-
interfering introspection, but an unfair case se because to be in a state of rage one must have 
already completely abandoned any effort at self-control or composure, and few other mental 
states are like this.) More importantly, all attempts to prove that a substantively non-intervening 
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form of introspection is possible are technically beside the point when it comes to Buddhist 
meditation virtuosos. 
 The reason the possibility of non-intervening introspection is beside the point is that, to 
the contrary, it is precisely the power of introspective meta-level practices to substantively 
intervene on the first-order mental states that they are directed at that makes meditation practice 
an effective tool for self-transformation. A significant part of the Buddhist path is predicated on 
the Buddha’s claim that when he added the meta-level, introspective element of mindfulness to 
his otherwise non-meta-level meditation practice, which previously consisted simply of one-
pointedness (focusing his attention on one thing, like staring at a sunset or candle flame), doing 
so not only changed everything, but led directly to his enlightenment. But he also taught that a 
significant part of his enlightenment was a function of the insights resulting from the penetration 
of mindfulness into the dynamics of his own mental states. That is, a blend of non-interfering and 
interfering elements of meditation seems to have resulted in his enlightenment: insights (about 
the nature of the self, the impersonal genesis of volition, and so forth)—resulting from what may 
perhaps be misleadingly described, according to some, as “bare attention,” which is in itself non-
interfering—manage to alter (interfere with) subsequent perceptions or mental states (constituted 
by impressions about the insubstantiality of the self, volitions, and so forth). What were earlier 
seen and believed to be solid, ontologically substantive, independently existing objects separate 
from a real, substantive, and independent self, once carefully attended to are subsequently 
perceived as permeable, ontologically insubstantial or empty, only dependently existing 
phenomena lacking any ontologically independent existence or supporting any substantive 
self/other boundary.  
 Much more may be said about this, but it is enough to note that neuroscience research on 
the minds and brains of long-term practitioners of Buddhist meditation techniques like 
mindfulness reveals that the transformative effects of this discipline are not only all in the mind, 
so to speak, but also measurably in the brain: the attention centers associated with introspective 
practices, for example, are significantly more dense in terms of neural matter and more active in 
terms of synaptic interactions during the practice (than in control groups).8 This sort of third-
personal evidence for the efficacy of what may be described as first-personal practices, it should 
be noted, is something behaviorist folks like Ryle, who favor the third-personal or objective 
perspective, would have to accept, but it does not necessarily imply, contrary to worries 
expressed by some,9 that this research proves that reductionism (of the mind to just the brain) is 
being shown thereby. Likewise, similar studies of compassion-generating meditation techniques 
reveal similarly large and active empathy centers in the brain.10 In the past decade alone, 
hundreds of related findings confirm the efficacy of introspective practices. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Lutz, Slagter, Dunne and Davidson (2008). 
9 Heuman (2014). 
10 Lutz, Brefczynski-Lewis, Johnstone, and Davidson (2008). 
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 How does all of this impact our assessment of Ryle’s objection? To my lights, these 
neuroscientific findings do directly support the Rylean point that introspection may interfere 
substantively in the minds of its practitioners, and significantly in their brains, to boot, on the one 
hand, but, in the context of the self-transformative purposes of introspective practices in 
Buddhism, these findings count as powerfully confirming evidence of their efficacy, on the other 
hand. Thus, these findings show that Ryle’s strict interpretation of introspection as purely non-
interfering internal observation was needlessly restrictive, if not misleading, insofar as it 
mischaracterizes what occurs in the most efficacious forms of introspection, in such a way that it 
appears easily rejected on that ground—in which case Ryle’s strict but exaggerated 
mischaracterization of introspection and subsequent rejection based on that exaggerated notion is 
a case of the straw man fallacy. Thus, we may set aside Rylean objections to the coherence of the 
concept of meditation. 
 The mere act of observing anything arguably affects the nature of the thing observed.11 
But Buddhist meditation presupposes and embraces this principle, and thus aims to change the 
mind through introspection. Ryle was one of the first noteworthy Western analytic philosophers 
to critique the notion of introspection. The next was the noted analytic philosopher, Robert 
Nozick, who doesn’t so much question the coherence of the concept as its efficacy and meaning. 
 
Nozick  
In one of his well-received comprehensive philosophical treatises, Philosophical Explanations, 
Robert Nozick argued that meditation might amount to a mere damping down of our cognitive 
apparatus. Nozick uses a thought experiment to pump our intuitions against the idea that there is 
any merit to meditation techniques and their associated ineffable states, but an analysis of ideas 
raised in his attack will prove useful to the Buddhist idea that meditation has powerful self-
transformative potential. Let us call his argument the “soundless stereo” argument. 
Consider a phonograph system as an apparatus of experience....  Now let us do the 
equivalent of quieting thoughts, namely, removing the record, perhaps also turning off 
the speakers and the turntable. When only the amplifier is on ..., what is the experience 
like? We do not know; perhaps infinite.... It would be a mistake to think there is an 
unusual reality being encountered.... None of the literature I know describes what ... the 
procedure would produce in the absence of an unusual reality or self, so we don’t know 
whether [it] is a revelation of an unusual reality or self, or instead an artifact of an 
unusual procedure of experiencing wherein most but not all functions are damped down. 
(Will this debunking explanation have more difficulty in explaining the surprising and 
often momentous changes in the people who have the experiences?)12 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Hacking (1983). 
12  Nozick (1981), 158-9. 
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Nozick’s intuition pump critiques the meditator’s interpreted experience—its background of 
substantive supramundane metaphysics—but does not necessarily speak to the assumption that 
the practitioner can disengage conscious awareness from its ordinary functioning, or take it off-
line, so to speak, from its ordinary engagement and identification with its own contents. He 
describes it as a kind of shutting down of the cognitive apparatus, but our analysis of the 
mechanics of introspective meditation will reveal not that it shuts down the cognitive apparatus, 
but rather that it interferes with it in a unique and empowering way, as well shall see, by 
disengaging it from its ordinary sensory-directed functioning. Thus, Nozick’s soundless stereo 
argument does not undermine the point that emerged from our rebuttal to Ryle (about the 
efficacy of interventionist meditation), on the one hand, and further analysis of this Nozick-
inspired notion of disengaging the cognitive apparatus from its typical on-line functioning, so to 
speak, will help for purposes of defending the most general claim of this paper, namely, that 
meditation matters, on the other hand. 
 In Buddhist philosophy (and much of the more broad Indian philosophy from which it 
originally derives), meditation is the path to liberation, construed as freedom from deterministic 
conative (volitional, motivational, intentional) chains, or karma. Although it is also practiced in 
other forms of Buddhism, Theravada Buddhists practice vipassana, “insight” or “mindfulness,” 
almost exclusively, which suggests the strategy of mental freedom through insight, based on 
introspection. I mention this because the mindfulness that is all the rage is derivative of this 
tradition. Mindfulness occurs throughout but also outside Buddhism as simply the opposite of 
mindlessness, but the traditional Buddhist practice of mindfulness meditation may be described 
as the disciplined effort of alert witnessing of what I described above as first-order mental states, 
which alert witnessing generates higher-order or meta-level mental states. In basic practice, one 
often first develops some level of concentration by focusing on only one specific object of 
consciousness, such as the flow of one’s breath (or anything).13 After proficiency in such “one-
pointedness” of attention focus is developed, one practices attentiveness to one’s entire 
conscious experience with no attempt to direct awareness, but rather with only the intent to 
notice or track one’s conscious states whatever their content, and wherever they lead on their 
own, without interference, judgment, or control.  
 Zen practitioners, for example, also extricate awareness from the first-order stream of 
occurrent thoughts, emotions, sensations, by simply sitting still and observing the stream of first-
order mental contents. This can create enough distance between the active (content-generating) 
and the passive (observing) components, though the passive component interferes (as has been 
shown), which interference is what helps tame the mind and prevent the content-generating 
component from overcoming the passive observing component. By the meta-level practice of 
motionlessly witnessing the spontaneous arousal and cessation of first-order mental states 
without interfering, but just attending carefully to the emergence of intentions, one develops an 
awareness of the spontaneous and thus impersonal character of their emergence, and thereby 
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gains greater control over the otherwise pre-conscious levers that otherwise mindlessly guide 
our acts. This is the essence of the Buddhist theory of mental freedom, akin to Freudian and 
other forms of insight-through-awareness and liberation-through-insight psychologies.14 
 Mind seeing mind—mindfulness, however impure in Ryle’s sense—is the key to 
vipassana. Sustained, keen awareness of psychological state x is thought to be the best route to 
insight about x. Vipassana, Zen, and other forms of Buddhist meditation have the common 
function of training attention by tracking the meditator’s mental states. Volitions are ‘intentional’ 
in Brentano’s sense, in that they have an aboutness to them, as do non-volitional thoughts, 
sentences, or other meaningful items that are about things. But they are also ‘intentional’ in the 
teleological sense that they involve intent, motive, purpose, a goal or end state toward which they 
point or move. We may thus say that mindfulness meditation cultivates the skills of cognition 
and intention tracking.  
 We may compare cognition or intention tracking with Nozick’s treatment of truth 
tracking as a condition on knowledge,15 his idea of value tracking as a condition on goodness,16 
and Wolf’s notion of reasons tracking as a condition on moral responsibility.17 I will illustrate 
only one of these notions, as a sample: Nozick’s idea that knowledge tracks the truth may be 
captured in the conditional, if when it is true that p you believe p and when it is false that p you 
disbelieve p, then your belief tracks the truth of p. Wolf’s and Nozick’s notions are metaphorical, 
since truth, values, and reasons are abstractions that may lack ontological substance (even for 
non-Buddhist realists), and thus they cannot literally be the objects of inspection or tracking. But 
intentions certainly exist, and we can concretely inspect and track them, however subtle they are 
and thus how difficult that may be. And Buddhist practitioners of mindfulness cultivate this 
ability to virtuoso levels. 
 In some versions of Buddhist mindfulness of walking or of eating meditations, for 
example, after first becoming proficient in tracking the physical sensations associated with the 
physical movements involved, which is no easy task itself, one then shifts attention to focus on 
the intentions that drive the movements, something so subtle that it is close to impossible to get a 
handle on except after quite some time in serious practice. The parallels between the utility of 
Nozick’s and Wolf’s tracking models and meditation as a form of mental state tracking suggest 
the utility of the skills of cognition and volition tracking as a condition on self-control and 
freedom from the bonds of habituated, conditioned, otherwise fairly mindless mental states. For 
without knowing one’s intentions intimately, one cannot help but be pushed or pulled by them. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Locke (1690) remarks about stepping back in awareness to gain control over intentions; Hampshire sees 
awareness of the causes that move one as the key (1975). The Zen or tradition advocates choiceless (non-contracted) 
awareness, as did Perls (1947), who also called his gestalt psychotherapy “concentration therapy.” For a functional 
analysis of all major forms of meditation, see Goleman (1988). For a deeper analysis of how meditation increases 
self-regulation, see Repetti (2010). 
15 Nozick (1981), 172-78.  
16 Nozick (1981), 317-31. 
17 Wolf (1990).	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Thus, these practices tend to increase the possibility of volitional self-regulation or autonomy.18 
Practices that increase self-transformation and autonomy are far from ineffective and 
meaningless, unlike otherwise useless amplifiers in the absence of music, contrary to Nozick’s 
soundless stereo argument. 
 One-pointedness training may be functionally defined as attention and intention training, 
for it is designed to train conscious attention, of what one dwells on, thinks about, attends to, is 
aware of, and so forth,19 and these are all objects of one’s interests, intentions, and so on. The 
instrumental utility of the notion of intention training ought to be clear: Attention training fosters 
intention tracking, and vice versa, and leads to volitional control. Together, intention training and 
tracking contribute to the formation of higher-order mental states involving an observer (tracker) 
and controller (trainer) of lower-order mental states: The higher-order tracker may attach a pro- 
or con- higher-order label, say, “desirable” or “undesirable,” to any spontaneously-arising first-
order mental state, and these evaluative designations facilitate volitional self-regulation.20 
 The proof of all of this is, again, something a behaviorist like Ryle would have to take 
seriously: observable, measurable behavior. As even Nozick himself admits, serious practitioners 
of meditation seem transformed by the practice, and they become visibly if not exceedingly 
altruistic, in ways that stand apart from that of the average good-natured person. To repeat the 
way he put it at the end of our quote of his attempt at debunking meditation above, Nozick 
asked: 
Will this debunking explanation have more difficulty in explaining the surprising and 
often momentous changes in the people who have the experiences?21 
Obviously, the radical behavioral changes that often accompany serious practitioners’ claims to 
transformative experiences are not restricted to increases in the size and activation levels of the 
neurons associated with empathy, but they also show up rather markedly in their demeanors—
tranquil, balanced, friendly, generous, nonjudgmental, compassionate, gentle, sensitive, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Repetti (2010). 
19 Graziano (2013) argues that consciousness itself may be understood and defined, roughly, as the selectivity of 
attention, such that we become conscious of those neural goings on that attention selects from among the larger set 
of cognitive and other mental phenomena encoded in neural networks and interactions, which attentive selection 
schemas are what generate and constitute conscious experience. If he is at all right, then the attention training that is 
cultivated in mindfulness and related forms of meditation may actually/literally increase quantities and perhaps also 
qualities of consciousness, which would confirm some Buddhist theories about its efficacy. Why would only some 
neural processes loop in on themselves in such a manner or, alternately, if that is all that consciousness is, then why 
would the brain bother to produce it? I think it is reasonable to think evolution favored those brains that do this 
because doing so facilitates memory and enables the ability to articulate accounts of what one was thinking and 
experiencing when one was acting, which abilities would be naturally selected for in social species governed by 
behavioral norms, such as primates. 
20 They also help construct the sort of volitional/metavolitional hierarchy Harry Frankfurt identified as free will and 
as constitutive of moral agents or persons (1971). On the convergence between Buddhist volitional regulation and 
Frankfurt’s hierarchical model of free will and personhood, see Repetti (2010). 
21 Nozick (1981), 159. 
	  16	  
	  
responsive, and so forth—and in their actions that typically reflect those dispositions, to the point 
of being enshrined in platitudes.  
 In fairness to Nozick, it may well be that supramundane elements of Buddhist ideology 
do often shore up these tendencies in many Buddhists, for example. Belief in the reality of 
reincarnation and karma, for example, may be easily understood to support the idea that the 
universe is just, that cosmic justice is built into the nature of things, a belief that is arguably 
deeply entrenched in certain religious cultures and even lingering in post-religious secular 
cultures like our own.22 This is the sort of belief Nozick has in mind when he suggests that, 
absent belief in a supramundane reality, meditation might not really amount to more than a mere 
damping down of one’s cognitive apparatus. If one enters into the sort of trance state that Nozick 
compares with a soundless stereo, feeling a sort of boundless oneness with a universe with built-
in cosmic justice, then that could explain significant altruism as a function of some sort of blend 
of altered states and faith in such beliefs. And that would certainly undermine the idea that 
meditation is evidentially valid for such individuals, especially if their view that it mattered 
rested on belief in karma, reincarnation, cosmic justice, and the idea that the trance-like state 
experienced in meditation was somehow a direct experience of some metaphysically 
transcendent reality. Undoubtedly, while that is not supposed to be built into the Buddhist 
experience, it may creep in anyway, and it is explicitly built into the Hindu/yogic experience. 
 However, absent those supramundane beliefs, we have already shown that meditation 
matters to self-regulation, and in ways that show up in the attention and empathy centers of the 
brain. Thus, we have supramundane-belief-independent reasons—non-confirmation-bias-
involving reasons—to think self-transformative behavioral results such as marked altruism stand 
as valid in their own right. Consequently, we may set aside Nozick’s objections to the idea that 
meditation does not really amount to much. Let us move on to some other objections. 
 Allen Ginsberg’s objection is not that meditation doesn’t work or matter, but that it is a 
kind of distraction that prevents the practitioner from changing the world, a complaint we have 
already taken apart. And Slavoj Žižek’s objection, along similar lines, is that it is worse than that. 
I address Ginsberg’s objection after my treatment of Nozick’s objection because Nozick’s and 
Ryle’s objections may be grouped together as different forms of the objection that meditation is 
ineffective or invalid, whereas Ginsberg’s objection is the first, historically, of several objections 
that may be grouped together as different forms of the objection we opened with (about it being a 
shortcoming of meditation that it is not world-changing), to the effect that meditation has 
negative social, political, and/or other societal consequences, a kind of objection made most 
forcefully by Slavoj Žižek, but also by Sharf, Purser and Loy, and Forbes (and Moore, who we 
already addressed). Let us first address the objections of Ginsberg and Žižek, as their objections 
more closely resemble each other than do those of Sharf, Purser and Loy, or Forbes. 
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Ginsberg and Žižek 
I met Allen Ginsberg through Ram Dass, one of my first and most beloved meditation teachers. 
Ram Dass spoke on many occasions about how his friend Allen Ginsberg often gave him a hard 
time, objecting that meditation draws people away from political activism, how he encouraged 
Ram Dass to get off the meditation cushion, stop retreating from the unjust world, and join in 
with him for political activism, and so forth. Ram Dass used Allen’s objections as a spring board 
for a number of his remarks in some of his talks, about how enlightened protest was not a 
contradiction, how it involved protesting unjust actions as opposed to those who perform them, 
how meditation reduces the tendency to polarize protestors into us and them, and so forth. Years 
later, when I contacted Allen (in 1989) and asked him to give a talk on Buddhism at the 
Brooklyn College Philosophical Society (I was then its president), he agreed, but only after 
giving me a hard time, this time about wasting my time majoring in analytic philosophy, with its 
excessive concerns for abstract logical points, scientific and mathematical reasoning, and 
language analysis, on the same grounds that it failed to engage critically with activist attempts to 
change the structure of society. (He not only gave a great talk on Buddhism, but he persuaded the 
rather large turnout of analytic philosophers to take refuge in the three jewels of Buddhism, in 
Sanskrit, thereby becoming Buddhists, in token if not in spirit.)  
 In any case, the point of this recounting is that my account of Ginsberg’s objections is 
entirely anecdotal and serves as a sort of priming introduction to the psychoanalyst, philosopher, 
and social critic Slavoj Žižek’s stronger version of the same objection. I’m sure Ginsberg’s 
tendency to speak in this way appears somewhere in print or other recordings of his talks, but 
nothing hinges on the need for an exact printed proof. I also mention Ginsberg’s objections 
because they are not academic, but pressingly personal, first, and because they are an earlier 
example of the same sort of objection made by Žižek, who has argued, more forcefully than 
Ginsberg, that meditation is an opiate for the now secular consumerist masses.  
 Žižek goes to fairly dramatic lengths to show how Buddhism-inspired but now 
fundamentally secular Western attitudes of non-judgmentalism, acceptance, passivity, pacifism, 
tranquility, equilibrium, and the like—the sort of dispositions that are aspired towards as the 
hopefully attainable consequences of transformative Buddhist meditative practices—fit very 
conveniently into, and help sustain an unquestioning attitude toward, the status quo of global 
capitalism, with its vast disparities of wealth and its promulgation of mass consumerism. He 
suggests that this is the reason mindfulness is all the rage that it now is in so many dimensions of 
public life and popular culture,23 almost as if the behind-the-scenes power brokers and strategic 
planners of global capitalist neoliberalism invented mindfulness precisely for this purpose—to 
create the metaphorical equivalent in workers and consumers of better milk-producing, obedient 
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cows. His extremely passionate manner of convinced, indignant expression alone seems to count 
as an additional argument in favor of his rather conspiratorial interpretation, but, technically, 
needs to be set aside as an entertaining rhetorical embellishment. In any case, the objection 
amounts to what I have described as the claim that Buddhist meditation is the new opiate of the 
now secular masses (in their post-modern withdrawal from the balm of religion), functioning 
essentially to help maintain the unequal capitalist power structures in place globally. It is a 
chilling view, one that certainly merits serious reflection. 
 I will say more about it below. But as I suggested earlier, the objections of Sharf, Purser 
and Loy, and Forbes are roughly in a league with those of Žižek, though not exactly so or as 
dramatic. Thus, before further rebutting Žižek’s objection (which, I take it, was already rebutted 
indirectly in my opening rebuttal of Moore’s non-world-changing objection), we will entertain 
their versions of the objection. I will nonetheless first sketch here my answer to Ginsberg and 
Žižek, and that is that it is a combination of Ram Dass’s answer and my own: Ram Dass argued 
that mindfulness and spiritual growth ought to make one a more enlightened and effective 
protester, when it is appropriate for one to do so (as opposed to when it is appropriate to spend 
time in reflection), and I argue that even if what Ginsberg and Žižek worry about is well 
founded, it is not necessarily the case that meditation must function as a means of pacifying 
potential activists or as an opiate of the masses. In fact, Purser and Loy, and Forbes, argue that it 
ought not to function that way, and together with Sharf they all may be said to appeal to the 
broader Buddhist ethical framework as the remedy to the ill effects of divorcing meditation from 
that very ethical framework. Odd as it may sound before hearing my reasons, and despite that 
their appeals to ethics refute Ginsberg and Žižek, I will ultimately reject the idea that the solution 
lies in the reconciliation of mindfulness with the ethical dimension of Buddhism. 
 
Sharf, Purser and Loy, and Forbes 
Robert Sharf, Ron Purser and David Loy, and David Forbes have objected to the extraction of 
mindfulness from its Buddhist ethical framework. Sharf has objected to the idea, popular among 
Westerners increasingly drawn toward mindfulness and other forms of Buddhist meditation, to 
the effect that they can extract these practices from the ethical and broader philosophical and 
cultural traditions within which they derive their meaning and value.24 He makes a strong case 
for the idea that the secularized extraction of mindfulness that is becoming increasingly 
privileged among Westerners who are drawn to it constitutes a serious distortion of the rather 
narrow social role and institutional function of the practice within Buddhist communities. He 
also thinks Westerners have literally distorted the techniques, the emphases on various teaching 
points connected with them, and their overall place and importance in Buddhist life. His 
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objections all have a range of validity, but I reject the idea that the Western embrace of 
mindfulness is diminished in any way by these putative facts. 
 In his last point, Sharf actually shares the view we will examine last, Flanagan’s and 
Thompson’s, to the effect that meditation is not as central to Buddhism as Westerners have come 
to think it is.25 Before we turn to that view, however, Ron Purser and David Loy have coined the 
term “McMindfulness” to capture and dramatize the same worries expressed by Sharf, and to 
highlight the many dimensions of the mindfulness explosion in popular culture, and David 
Forbes has supported the same concerns, but from what may be described as more of an 
“integral” philosophical perspective, that is, a perspective that sees the contemplative dimension 
as only one part of us that needs to be integrated into the many other dimensions of our 
intrapersonal and interpersonal being—a perspective that seems intuitively correct. All of these 
thinkers make valid points, and their concerns are all nobly intended to preserve the meaning and 
value of mindfulness, to protect the venerable contemplative traditions that have delivered it to 
us, and to ward off potential misunderstandings, distortions, abuses, and applications. I do not 
take issue with these fine elements of their concerns. 
 The elements of these views that I do take issue with may be responded to in roughly the 
same way I responded to Ginsberg’s objection, their otherwise important and interesting 
differences in focus and emphasis notwithstanding. I sketched above what my response to this 
line of criticism would be: a blend of Ram Dass’s and my own, together with my response to 
calls from some of these very critics to restore the ethical connection to the practices that have 
become separated from that connection. But let me start with the latter idea first, the idea that the 
ethical dimension of meditation must be emphasized. While I think this is possibly an acceptable 
thing to do, and that there might be many great improvements that could result from the teaching 
of an ethical perspective or framework in connection with the teaching of mindfulness, for 
example, I do not think it is necessary or necessarily ideal, for a few reasons, despite my 
generally positive attitude toward the teaching and promotion of ethical values. After all, I do 
teach ethics classes, but they are part of a philosophy curriculum. (God forbid if ethics became 
extracted from the philosophy curriculum, popularized, and watered down to the point where 
everyone found it fashionable to try to justify their actions by casuistry, reasoning from universal 
principles like the principle that like cases ought to be treated alike, and so forth.) 
 Contrary to all these worries to the effect that ethics is divorced from mindfulness (as if 
mindfulness is some power than can wield great harm if not properly harnessed and regulated by 
ethical beings or norms), mindfulness is intuitively distinct from ethics per se, in its own nature, 
on the one hand, and that is as it should remain, on the other. As I mentioned in passing early on, 
mindfulness exists outside the Buddhist tradition simply as the opposite of mindlessness. Paying 
attention to what one is doing, thinking, feeling, perceiving, or experiencing—these are natural 
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abilities of human beings. The discipline of training oneself to cultivate these abilities—greater 
degrees of mindfulness—owes much to Buddhism for developing it, but mindfulness is not the 
province of Buddhism any more than propositional logic or the scientific method are the 
province of Western philosophy, though anyone who wishes to cultivate their propositional 
logical skills or their skills in the use of the scientific method owes a historical debt to Western 
philosophy and science, and may be well served to turn toward them for guidance. Indeed, 
orthodox Indian philosophers from the Buddha’s day could equally object that he divorced the 
one-pointedness meditation technique from Brahmanism and its important metaphysical 
conceptions, but Buddhists and others who embrace one-pointedness will celebrate this heretical 
violation, rightly, as far as I can tell. 
 As Ginsberg made clear when he criticized me for studying philosophy, he had the same 
view of analytic philosophy that some of our other critics here have of mindfulness, but these 
objections are analogous to objecting to science because of its unethical uses or applications. It is 
not science, analytic philosophy, or mindfulness that are problems. Rather, it is the lack of 
ethical dispositions, wisdom, and/or virtues that are the problem in all such cases, and those 
things have nothing to do with philosophy, science, or mindfulness, per se. (This is my 
somewhat twisted version of turning the objections from those who complain about the divorce 
of mindfulness from Buddhist ethics on its head.) Ironically, but in pertinent point, mindfulness 
and related meditation practices, if anything, actually tend to increase ethical sensitivity.26 Forbes 
mentions that some proponents of mindfulness, of which I am one, see mindfulness in this regard 
as subversively revolutionary, ethical, politically engaging, and all the things these critics worry 
that it might not be, insofar as it tends to produce dispositions to reflect on everything, toward 
altruistic sensitivity, and so forth, but he worries that in the hands of such manipulators as the 
military and Google those tendencies will be downplayed. He may be right, to a certain extent, 
under certain circumstances. But it is the uses of cell phones, hammers, and just about anything 
else, as opposed to those objects alone, that are what matter in determining whether they are 
being put to proper or good use. 
 On my analysis, it is those uses of meditation under those circumstances (by the military, 
Google, and so forth) that would be the problem, if they would be a problem at all, not 
mindfulness itself. If part of your Samurai, Ninja, or Marine training is in the use of mindfulness 
in order to make you a better warrior, assassin, or soldier, and your martial code is so powerfully 
psychologically, socially, or otherwise compelling that your mindfulness practice will not likely 
render that code itself the object of your serious ethical reflection, then there seems intuitively to 
be a problem with bushido (the martial code), not with practices of disciplining attention, per se. 
Similar rebuttals may easily be surmised for all the other versions of this objection mentioned 
above, mutatis mutandis. There is nothing inherently negative about awareness, or the absence of 
mindlessness. To the contrary, as Socrates noted (and toward which insight he devoted his life, 
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unto and upon penalty of death), awareness of one’s own ignorance contains the very seed of 
wisdom. And wisdom is probably the greatest virtue, as it inclines one toward all other virtues.  
 The quite traditional monk Bhikkhu Bodhi addresses the question “whether mindfulness 
can legitimately be extracted from its traditional context and employed for secular purposes.”27 
He holds such applications of mindfulness not only acceptable, but admirable, because they 
reduce suffering, so he agrees with the tenor of this paper. He does suggest, however, that the 
reductionist examination of mindfulness associated with what may be described as contemplative 
neuroscience threatens to distort our understanding of mindfulness, and that for investigators to 
fully understand it they need to see it as embedded within the religious tradition in which it is 
rooted. This is a view he shares with Evan Thompson, but I do not think Thompson is against the 
idea of also researching the phenomenon independently of the religious tradition.28 Before we 
turn to Flanagan’s and Thompson’s claims, however, there is one more analogy I would like to 
make about the complaint regarding extracting mindfulness from its larger Buddhist context. 
 Let me paint a picture of the background for this analogy, which is about the popular 
divorce of yoga from Hinduism in the West, based on my own personal experience. I have been 
practicing what I have always thought and continue to think was traditional, Patanjali-based, 
eight-limbed yoga—what Swami Vivekenanda dubbed “Rajah Yoga” (“kingly yoga”) his fancy 
description for the eight-limbed path of yoga outlined by the ancient sage Patanjali in his classic 
treatise on the subject, the Yoga Sutras—for as long as I have been practicing meditation, over 
40 years now. Indeed, it was my experience of something fantastic, something powerfully 
mystical and mind-blowing, at the end of my very first yoga session—an unexpected, full-blown 
out-of-body experience—that led me to take on the practice of meditation as part of my 
investigation into the spiritual and philosophical dimensions of yoga, for all the texts I could get 
my hands on recommended meditation as the most powerful key to spiritual growth. I spent the 
next several years of my life as a very serious yogi (practitioner of yoga and meditation) and a 
member of an extended set of three overlapping sanghas (spiritual communities) initially defined 
by three teachers, Ram Dass, Hilda Charlton, and Ma Jaya (then “Joya”), and a universalist blend 
of mostly Hindu and some Buddhist and other teachings they shared. I was taught the value of 
traditionalism, and my three teachers never charged us for their services, which included training 
in yoga, meditation, philosophy, and other forms of esoteric wisdom. I became quite adept at all 
eight stages of yoga (union, oneness), especially the asanas (postures), pranayama (breathing 
exercises), dhyāna (attainment of one-pointedness), and samādhi (meditative trance absorption), 
and soon began to lead a private weekly group of yogis in these practices.  
 Once just the asanas—which are but one of the eight limbs of traditional yoga—began to 
be treated as if they were identical to yoga itself, to appear in gyms alongside aerobics classes 
and the like, and to become commercialized (and rather successful, at that), I must confess I 
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experienced mixed feelings. On the one hand, I was happy to see some element of yoga finally 
catching on in the larger culture, even if it was one of the least spiritually transformative 
elements of the eight-limbed path of yoga that was catching on (the postures), but on the other 
hand, I was disheartened to see only that element of yoga being treated as the aspect of yoga that 
would be absorbed into the larger culture, what may be described somewhat diminutively as 
merely the body-sculpting, stress-relieving, bodily-flexibility-promoting aspect of yoga postures. 
(It will be helpful to pause here to note that it is no objection against the widespread popularity 
of asanas-as-yoga that such a practice is not designed to eradicate social injustices, nor against 
even the totally traditional, full-blown eight-limbed yoga taught by Patanjali.)  
 My ultimate digestion of this discomfort with the extraction of the asanas from the larger 
eight-limbed tradition of yoga may be reflected in the Buddhist adage: May a thousand flowers 
bloom. In other words: So what? Who cares? Why not? At least the annoying multitude of yoga-
mat-toting (and sustainable-shopping-bag-toting) conformists, so to speak, is following that, 
instead of, say, following alcoholism, pugilism, fascism, or nihilism. And some of them are 
being drawn to traditional, full-fledged, eight-limbed yoga, thanks in no small part to the social 
acceptability of the popularized albeit watered down forms of yoga. There is probably some truth 
in the historical speculation to the effect that the yoga-mat swarm helped pave the way for the 
mindfulness swarm. Likewise, some of the folks constituting the mindfulness swarm are being 
drawn to traditional, full-fledged, Buddhist-eightfold-path-situated mindfulness, rather than 
being drawn to Ponzi schemes, religious fundamentalism, marijuana, or reality TV. 
 I may be guilty of confirmation bias, but one thing I feel fairly confident about is that 
many of the thousands of people I have taught meditation to, over the many years of my tenure 
as a Dharma teacher, yoga instructor, and philosophy professor, have learned something 
empowering and transformative: they have learned that they are capable of investigating their 
own minds and bodies—their intentions, emotions, bodily sensations, thoughts, beliefs, values, 
relationships, world views, life hopes, senses of self, hopes, fears, dreams, shadows, hatreds, 
judgments, and everything and anything else going on within them and without them—directly, 
personally, clearly, objectively. They have also learned that they can nurture themselves with the 
same compassion that they can lend to others, creating the conditions for their own healing, self-
understanding, self-acceptance, and self-transformation. And they have learned that every 
moment is one in which mindfulness is the way to fully experience it, absorb it, digest it, and 
assimilate it, and mindlessness is the way to miss out on it, to fail to absorb, digest, or assimilate 
it. For most of the rest of them, I may be being naively optimistic, but I believe their meditation 
experiences function as slow-to-sprout seeds, if not effective inoculations against a variety of 
existential ills. 
 When asked once what he thought was the greatest thing about meditation in his life after 
all these years of promoting it, Ram Dass said that its value was best seen in its absence: during 
those times in his life that his practice lapsed he found himself walking around with a lot of 
undigested experiences. If mindfulness helps us digest experiences in this insanely unjust, 
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information-overloaded world, then the complaint that it is a shortcoming of mindfulness that it 
fails to attempt to change an unjust world into a just one is analogous to the complaint that it is a 
shortcoming of antacids and probiotics that they fail to attempt to change an unjust world into a 
just one. Antacids and probiotics help us digest food; mindfulness helps us digest life. 
 I think we have sufficiently dispensed with the complaint to the effect that it is a 
shortcoming of mindfulness that it fails to attempt to change an unjust world into a just one. Let 
us turn, then, to the complaint to the effect that meditation plays less of a role in Buddhism than 
is commonly thought among Westerners, and thus is not as important to experts on it as we 
neophyte enthusiasts would like to think it is. Another, perhaps more exaggerated and unkind, 
way of expressing this complaint is to say—with a subtle but smug smirk—that you meditation 
newbies are making more of it than even the authoritative cognoscenti make of it, you are 
naively misguided, and your sought-after equanimity is adolescent, so knock it off already! 
 
Flanagan and Thompson 
Owen Flanagan29 and Evan Thompson30 each have claimed that meditation does not really 
matter to Buddhism the way Westerners have imagined it does, and that relatively few Buddhists 
actually meditate on a serious basis, as if the latter claim is evidence of the former. As Thompson 
put it, “Buddhism isn’t reducible to meditation—most Buddhists throughout history haven’t 
practiced sitting meditation.” 31 I do not want to give any false impressions about these otherwise 
brilliant philosophers, so it should be made clear that they are not really rejecting meditation so 
much as they are responding to its becoming a fetish among both Western practitioners of 
mindfulness and neuroscientists who might be thought to be testing Buddhism in the lab, as if 
meditating brains hold the keys to understanding Buddhism. But as valid as these intentions are, 
and I share them for the most part, this sort of claim itself—that meditation is not widely 
practiced among Buddhists, and the associated implication that it doesn’t matter that much to 
Buddhism—still captures my interest the most, perhaps because I have made my own meditation 
practice the centerpiece of my philosophical life for over 40 years now. I may therefore be biased 
in my motivations, but that ought not to affect the validity of my argument. 
 Although Flanagan makes the same claim as Thompson about the small number of 
meditation practitioners in Buddhism, he also tries to hedge against its implication to the effect 
that meditation doesn’t matter that much in Buddhism by arguing that it only matters that some 
meditation practitioners become virtuosos and thus instantiate, evidence, and validate those 
Buddhist claims that revolve around meditation. Fair enough, per se. In light of these and their 
other sympathetic concerns with meditation, perhaps it is not entirely accurate to saddle either 
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Flanagan or Thompson with the claim that I want to rebut, to the effect that because few 
Buddhists practice meditation it doesn’t really matter that much to Buddhism, so I will simply 
assess that claim on its own, independently of whether this or that individual (or anyone, for that 
matter) wants to defend it, although some individuals clearly do hold the claim.32 
 I think one analogy alone ought to put an end to the sort of objection to the effect that 
meditation doesn’t really matter even to the traditions that have brought it into great focus, as 
evidenced by its relatively small number of serious practitioners. Thus, consider this analogous 
argument:  
Few Westerners participate in the practice of scholarly philosophy or scientific research 
on a regular basis—far less than one percent of the Western population throughout the 
history of Western society. Thus, philosophy and science do not really matter much, even 
within the traditions that brought them into great focus. 
Hopefully, the fallacious nature of this analogous claim ought to be self-evident, but in case it is 
not, let us examine it some, in order to render its fallacious nature as perspicuous as possible. 
 Thus, the mere fact that less than, say, one percent of Westerners now and throughout 
Western history are or were actually practicing philosophers or scientists surely does not entail 
that philosophy and science are unimportant in current or earlier periods of Western society. To 
the contrary, though philosophers and scientists constitute a handful of people relative to the 
larger population, it is undeniable even that a very small, fractional subset of those philosophers 
and scientists that do or have practiced their crafts have had a tremendous impact on Western 
society. Take Plato, Aristotle, Copernicus, Newton, Bacon, Descartes, Darwin, Einstein, and 
Marx, to name just a few scientists and/or philosophers who have had monumental impact. Does 
the small percentage of practicing philosophers and scientists undermine the validity or 
importance of philosophy or science? The idea that it does is absurd.  
 If the scientific method and philosophical analysis became all the rage, so to speak, in 
Buddhist societies the way mindfulness has become all the rage in Western society, the parallel 
objection to the effect that the scientific method and analytic philosophy are not even all that 
important or widely practiced in the traditions that birthed and gave prominence to the scientific 
method and analytic philosophy would be as obviously absurd as the objection to Westerners 
embracing mindfulness to the effect that mindfulness doesn’t really matter much or wind up 
actually being practiced much among Buddhists. But we need not wait for that reversal to happen 
to see the absurdity of this objection to mindfulness. 
 Yes, some folks are over-zealous, and others are over-emphasizing and perhaps hastily 
embracing overly confident interpretations of the powers and applications of mindfulness. And 
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yes, that bothers some Buddhists the way that the popularity of espresso and latte in Starbuck’s 
might bother some Italians. But so what? Buddhists—of all people—ought to be able to deal 
with being bothered by such things. And, just as the objection about mindful Ninjas is rightly 
about Ninjas and not about mindfulness, so too the objection here is rightly about exaggerators 
and not about mindfulness. 
 
Conclusion 
In closing, I should make clear that I respect the otherwise insightful analyses, and I appreciate 
all the concerns, that the thinkers examined here have expressed about issues connected with 
meditation, apart from those specific aspects of their claims that I have rejected. I reiterate that 
my objections are restricted to these rather narrow features of their claims. Indeed, some of these 
critics are respected colleagues, personal friends, or both. My target has been simply to defend 
meditation against the four basic objections to the effect that it doesn’t work, doesn’t change the 
world, matters negatively, or doesn’t matter. 
 In conclusion, while non-interfering meditation may be impossible in some cases, it is not 
impossible in all, but even when it is impossible it is the interfering that makes meditation 
effective, contra Ryle, and that shows it is not merely a damping down of our cognitive 
equipment, contra Nozick, but also something that strengthens our ability to regulate our 
volitions. Mindfulness can increase the disposition to altruistic engagement, rather than a retreat 
from unpleasant aspects of reality, contra Moore, Ginsberg, and Žižek. The independence of 
mindfulness from Buddhism’s ethical framework is natural and desirable for various reasons, 
contra Sharf, Purser and Loy, Bodhi, and Forbes. The problems of meditation and x, so to speak, 
are problems of x, not of meditation, per se. And meditation matters, despite how few serious 
practitioners there are or have been, contra Flanagan and Thompson, within or outside 
Buddhism. 
 The opposite of mindlessness is as natural as is mindlessness, but unfortunately not as 
ubiquitous, and therefore its introduction into almost every conceivable venue in which 
mindlessness is the norm is at least as important as is the ubiquity of mindlessness—and 
therefore actually promises to be world-changing at the grass roots level. It is intuitively 
desirable in almost every conceivable case in which mindlessness is not desirable, just as the 
opposites of stupidity or of uncritical thinking are intuitively desirable in almost every 
conceivable case in which stupidity and uncritical thinking are not desirable. Of course, there are 
exceptions, but those are, by definition, exceptional.  
 Mindfulness matters, I conclude, most especially and significantly to those who do 
actually practice it seriously, who experience its impact directly, and thus who know its power, 
validity, and import in and over the course of their lives. And it matters to all of those who are 
close to them, whose lives are touched by them, whether they realize it or not. Every act of 
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kindness, for example, even a friendly gesture toward a stranger, prompted by mindfulness, 
contributes to the common good. The amount of selfish competitiveness, insensitivity, 
judgmentalism, arrogance, aggression, and violence that would be emanating from me and that 
would have emanated from me over the course of my life had I not been practicing meditation 
for over 40 years certainly counts in the equation to assess the effectiveness of the practice and 
the extent to which it contributes to the common good or tends towards changing the world for 
the better, and I am but one person.  
 This article was not written so much on behalf of those who know all of this from their 
years on and off the meditation cushion as it was written on behalf of those who do not know any 
of this from firsthand experience, that is, for those who are, in a sense, mindless regarding the 
negative powers of mindlessness and the positive powers and importance of mindfulness. In light 
of all these points, it is incredible that otherwise really smart folks should be lamenting the 
explosion of interest in mindfulness. Imagine the horror of a world in which nearly everyone 
spent significant time cultivating mindfulness! 
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